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Mathematical models are increasingly relied upon as decision support tools, which 
 estimate risks and generate recommendations to underpin public health policies. 
However, there are no formal agreements about what constitutes professional com-
petencies or duties in mathematical modeling for public health. In this article, we 
propose a framework to evaluate whether mathematical models that assess human 
and animal disease risks and control strategies meet standards consistent with ethical 
“good practice” and are thus “fit for purpose” as evidence in support of policy. This 
framework is derived from principles of biomedical ethics: independence, transparency 
(autonomy), beneficence/non-maleficence, and justice. We identify ethical risks asso-
ciated with model development and implementation and consider the extent to which 
scientists are accountable for the translation and communication of model results to 
policymakers so that the strengths and weaknesses of the scientific evidence base and 
any socioeconomic and ethical impacts of biased or uncertain predictions are clearly 
understood. We propose principles to operationalize a framework for ethically sound 
model development and risk communication between scientists and policymakers. 
These include the creation of science–policy partnerships to mutually define policy ques-
tions and communicate results; development of harmonized international standards for 
model development; and data stewardship and improvement of the traceability and 
transparency of models via a searchable archive of policy-relevant models. Finally, we 
suggest that bespoke ethical advisory groups, with relevant expertise and access to 
these resources, would be beneficial as a bridge between science and policy, advising 
modelers of potential ethical risks and providing overview of the translation of modeling 
advice into policy.
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iNtrODUctiON
Access to “big data” and new computing technologies has 
increased the utility of mathematical models and algorithms, 
including the potential to “fast-track” decision-making to miti-
gate risks. They enable scientists to explore experimental hypoth-
eses that are difficult or unethical to test in complex real-world 
systems. They have also been used as forecasting tools to assess 
disease risk, improve surveillance, understand the implications 
of risk-mitigating interventions, and allocate resources during 
public health emergencies (1, 2).
Many epidemiological forecasting models have utilitarian 
aims: to minimize risk of disease and to maximize health for the 
study population. Although the modeling process may diminish 
uncertainties about disease risks, it may also uncover or create 
new ethical problems that have impacts upon risk management. 
The foreseeable, predictable, yet uncertain nature of these issues 
and an absence of ownership or accountability for the manage-
ment of ethical risk (as a joint science-policy problem), creates 
a moral dilemma that needs to be resolved before models, as 
evidence for policy, can be considered truly “fit for purpose.”
In this article, we propose a framework based on principles of 
biomedical ethics to evaluate whether mathematical models that 
assess human and animal disease risks and control strategies meet 
“good practice” standards and are “fit for purpose” as evidence in 
support of policy. We subsequently propose initiatives to improve 
opportunities for ethical model building and risk communication 
between scientists and policymakers.
FrAMeWOrK tO PrOMOte etHicAL, 
“GOOD PrActice” stANDArDs
Although there are informal guidelines that specify best practice, 
there are no formal agreements about what constitutes profes-
sional competencies or duties in mathematical modeling for 
public health [(3, 4), p. 18]. Thus, it is difficult to objectively 
assess whether models produce policy evidence that is “fit for 
purpose,” and it is unclear to whom this responsibility belongs 
(i.e., policymaker or scientist). Nonetheless, if model evidence is 
not assessed objectively, there is a possibility that ethical mistakes 
may be made that ultimately undermine the success of policies 
and regulatory decisions in human and animal health and erode 
public trust in science and government.
We propose four major criteria that offer a framework to 
determine the suitability of scientific outputs as evidence for 
policy and examine the degree to which mathematical models 
meet these standards. These criteria are derived from the four 
fundamental principles of biomedical ethics (5): autonomy (i.e., 
the right to make informed decisions, which in turn requires 
sufficient independent and transparent information), beneficence 
(i.e., being of benefit to the end user), non-maleficence (i.e., doing 
no harm), and justice (i.e., fair distribution of benefits, risks, and 
costs). The principles of independence and transparency are also 
articulated specifically in case law as the necessary foundation 
for scientific advice, which informs risk assessment (6, 7). The 
latter are fundamental precursors for autonomy but were thought 
best considered as distinct and separate criteria. Conversely, 
beneficence and non-maleficence are condensed into a single 
criterion (see Table 1 for a summary).
independence
Scientific evidence should be derived autonomously through 
objective, established methods and subject to scientific and ethi-
cal review, to avoid “the misuses or abuses of … information for 
political purposes or inefficient regulation due to overestimation 
of scientific sources” [(8), p. 147]. Conflicts of interest must 
be identified and resolved so that actors at the science–policy 
interface have clear lines of accountability for the consequences 
of their decisions.
Models may be developed independently, but are likely to 
be influenced by direct or indirect dialogue with policymakers, 
which may create unintended opportunities for them to become 
tools for policy-based evidence making, rather than evidence-
based policymaking (9). Although mathematics is often assumed 
to be “free of ideological or ethical issues” [(10), p. 2], model 
frameworks are typically informed by how modelers perceive the 
system at risk, translate knowledge into quantitative parameters 
(11, 12), prioritize inclusion or exclusion of different drivers of 
influence and transparently compose, and transcribe and share 
the mathematical code and data for the construction of a model 
framework (10). Specific modeling approaches have cultural his-
tories associated with individuals, institutions, and preferences 
of funding bodies that heavily influence and impact upon model 
framework selection, subsequent model evaluation, and their 
ability to be objectively critiqued (13). Consensus between mul-
tiple, seemingly “independent” models may not be meaningful if 
data sources and cultural history are shared between modeling 
groups (14).
transparency
Transparency refers to the clear documentation of the scientific 
approach so that methods are robust, repeatable, and reproduc-
ible, and outcomes are clearly communicated and understood. 
This documentation includes information about conflicts of 
interest, constraints, or biases affecting data collection and inter-
pretation (e.g., intersectional analysis of the effect of class, racial, 
ethnic, gender, or sexual categorizations) and any assumptions or 
uncertainties inherent in the modeling process.
Mathematical models are documented and communicated 
through physical representation in text, tables, or figures and 
through formal discussion within and between the scientific 
community, decision-makers, and the public [(14), p. 2]. In 
academia, model coding practices do not conform to industrial 
standards and are not always open source, making them dif-
ficult to reproduce, compare, or independently critique. Model 
parameters are typically estimated by statistical inference or 
expert opinion and may be extrapolated from comparable (to a 
greater or lesser extent) data if there is scientific uncertainty or 
a weak evidence base for a system (15). When data are scarce, 
assumptions about important “drivers” (i.e., risk factors) in 
the model will become more influential. However, if multiple, 
interdependent assumptions about immeasurable uncertainties 
are made, it is difficult to meaningfully quantify the impact of 
these upon the credibility and accuracy of model results. This is 
tABLe 1 | A framework for modelers to promote ethical “good practice” in building a scientific evidence base for policy development.
criteria summary description evaluation of ethical risk
Independence Models are subjective tools, which reflect modelers’ perception of 
the system at risk. They are influenced by prior art in the area and 
cultural research links between individuals/institutes. Independence 
is compromised if conflicts of interest arise (e.g., if modelers are 
responsible for both design and communication of model merits, as 
increasingly is the case)
•	 Is the model provenance known and well documented (i.e., the 
full history of model development, including funding sources, 
conceptual design, coding, verification, peer-review processes 
and publication, as well as the modelers involved in the 
development)?
•	 Has the model been validated using independent data sources 
not used for model parameterization?
Transparency A high level of technical skill and expertise and some fluency in the 
language of mathematical models are required to communicate 
model constraints, uncertainties, and assumptions to policymakers. 
This makes it difficult for complex models to be scrutinized by a 
diversity of relevant audiences. Without the assistance of experts 
in risk communication who can broker this knowledge, and 
robust frameworks for knowledge exchange, policymakers may 
misinterpret strengths and weakness of model recommendations
•	 Is there clear documentation of the scientific approach so that 
methods are robust, repeatable and reproducible?
•	 Is there information about potential conflicts of interest, 
constraints, or biases affecting data collection and analyses 
(e.g., racial, ethnic, class, sexual, and gender issues) and any 
assumptions or uncertainties inherent in the modeling process?
•	 Is the model code open source or available on request?
•	 Are the model assumptions well described and documented 
and understood by policymakers?
Beneficence/non-maleficence Beneficence is contingent on excellent, ethical model design and 
diligent protection of data subjects. Irreducible model uncertainties 
may inadvertently expose research subjects/stakeholders to risks 
without a guarantee of beneficial outcomes for the population. Few 
models are evaluated to determine whether recommendations are 
accurate or effective because there are few “checks and balances” 
for post-dissemination model quality or utility.
•	 If a policy decision is based on the model evidence, is it more 
likely to be effective and beneficial than a decision made in the 
absence of the model?
•	 Has the model been verified, i.e., does it do what the modeler 
wants it to do?
•	 Has the model been validated? (i.e., does it realistically map 
onto what is occurring in real life).
•	 What are the sources and magnitude of uncertainty in the 
model—are these associated with parametric uncertainty or 
model selection?
Justice Models are useful “thought experiments.” However, if model 
evidence is intended to inform policy in the real world, modelers 
have a duty of care to consider and communicate ethical issues. 
Ethical risks are influenced by model variability and uncertainty that 
have important impacts on the distribution of beneficial or harmful 
consequences.
•	 Is any lack of knowledge about important parameters 
attributable to uncertainty or variability?
•	 Where possible, is model variability attributed to known factors, 
to create more ethical outcomes?
•	 If interventions based on model predictions are implemented in 
the real world, can the predicted benefits and harms to different 
individuals and subpopulations be quantified?
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exacerbated if modelers are reluctant to express model uncer-
tainty in case it undermines the credibility of the model in the 
eyes of the model user (14). Ambiguity over model assumptions 
and methods, variability and uncertainty, and matters of ethics 
and equity of outcomes may be difficult for decision-makers 
to identify, if risk is communicated as a single estimate [(16), 
p. 310]. Transparency is further impaired because of the lack 
of a common language between modelers and policymakers, 
where the latter will have limited knowledge of the specialist 
mathematical and statistical techniques utilized. In the absence 
of other contextualizing evidence, models and algorithms can 
become designated as a “black box,” creating a powerful “regime 
of justification,” which is unlikely to be questioned or held to 
account (ethically or empirically) by end-users [(10), p. 12] who 
may have a reputational commitment to favored projects and an 
unrealistic picture of the certainty associated with the system. 
This idea has been conceptualized as an intermediate “trough of 
certainty” between practitioners, cognizant with methodological 
limitations and uncertainties, and those far removed (e.g., the 
public), who have little belief in such expert opinion (17). 
Consequently, policymakers may incorrectly hold social, politi-
cal, or economic factors more accountable than model failures 
for any undesirable outcomes.
Alternative methods, such as multicriteria decision analysis, 
have been adopted in some disciplines to support transparency 
in benefit-risk assessment (18). Similarly, mathematical modeling 
could be considered a convenient framework to integrate and 
interpret different types of evidence, while trying to capture 
aspects of the “true” reality.
Beneficence/Non-Maleficence
Research design (including choice and allocation of any inter-
ventions) should be sound, protect, and prevent subjects from 
experiencing harm (i.e., adhere to principles of non-maleficence) 
and provide accurate, precise answers that are robustly derived, 
recorded, and reported by competent experts in relevant fields. 
Beneficent research should not only be excellent in design but 
also aim to enhance welfare for participants and (by extension) 
stakeholders. Scientifically invalid research is always unethical 
because it exposes research subjects to risks without possible 
benefit [(3), p. 7].
Access to robust, reliable, relevant, and timely data is 
one of the biggest obstacles to achieving model beneficence. 
Researchers must balance their desire for wider data access and 
sharing with their responsibility to ensure that data subjects 
are not exposed to (non-physical) harms. Risks to individuals’ 
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rights to privacy and issues of confidentiality and consent have 
emerged with new data mining and statistical methodologies 
that facilitate greater exploitation of “big” data sets. Although 
historically management of data quality, lifecycle, and security 
may have been undertaken in a relatively ad hoc manner by some 
individual researchers or institutions, increased opportunities 
and requirements for data sharing in combination with new, 
more stringent data legislation and examples from case law (19) 
indicate that greater emphasis must be placed on auditable data 
management processes (20, 21).
Even if data are available, there will always be uncertainty 
in model choice and parameterization, as well as unknown 
uncertainties in the system that cannot be empirically meas-
ured or tested and thus never fully accounted for in any model 
framework. For example, useful predictive mathematical 
models are unlikely to perfectly reconstruct past epidemic 
events (4, 14), defining an implicit “trade-off ” between the 
definition of observed “noise” as stochastic (random) variability 
or as unknown uncertainty. This is particularly problematic in 
models that are developed to predict the occurrence and trajec-
tory of rare events when data are scarce and the timeframe for 
prediction is long.
The degree of model uncertainty has important impacts on 
model beneficence. This was illustrated in 2014, when models 
were published providing imprecise range estimates of the 
number of predicted Ebola infections (22). Although there are 
arguably benefits to preparing for “worst-case” scenarios, as in 
this case, there are also important practical (i.e., inappropriate 
investment in, and allocation of, health resources) and intan-
gible costs (i.e., loss of credibility and trust) from imprecise 
predictions, especially if the model uncertainties are poorly 
communicated. Uncertainty in model selection has the potential 
to generate both uncertainty and bias (i.e., systematic errors). 
Models in which uncertainty about the outcome is associated 
with parameter uncertainty or stochastic variability may be less 
prone to bias. A model, which estimates a wide interval in which 
future observations/events may fall, can be seen to be beneficent 
if that interval includes the ultimate observed outcome, while 
genuinely reflecting the degree of uncertainty around the 
outcome.
Policy decisions based on model evidence should be more 
effective than decisions made in the absence of a model (1). An 
excellent, beneficent model is one that does what the modeler 
wants it to do (verified) but also realistically maps to what 
is occurring in real life (validated) (1, 4). Model evaluation 
(validation and verification) is important as it offers some quality 
assurance on model utility. Most models are verified, but fewer 
are fully validated because of the lack of harmonized standards 
within or between research groups, and a dearth of timely data 
for this purpose (23, 24). As a result, model evaluation often relies 
on the same sparse data used to initially parameterize the model. 
Sensitivity analyses (which vary parameter values to quantify 
the impact of uncertainty) are offered as supporting evidence to 
demonstrate model robustness. However, these may be of limited 
value if the parameter being analyzed is not well specified in the 
model because there is no evidence base at all. Furthermore, 
as all sensitivity analyses are carried out within the reference 
frame of the chosen model, it tells the user nothing about the 
interplay between the parameter and model choice uncertainty 
(15). Scientific consensus about model outputs is also utilized to 
increase end-user confidence in model outputs (and highlight 
model excellence). However, consensus is not improbable if a 
narrow range of policy options is explored and different modeling 
groups have access to the same data, share a common modeling 
culture and funding sources, and seek to publish in similar jour-
nals with the same pool of reviewers.
Once produced, mathematical models are easy to implement 
and can become tools to support “fast-track” decision-making. 
This may be desirable for decision-makers but is paradoxically 
less useful in early stages of disease outbreaks that are often 
characterized by “great chaos and uncertainty” (25). Unlike 
pharmaceuticals (26) or medical devices [(27), (28), Art 1, (29)], 
there are few, if any, regulatory procedures that provide checks 
and balances about model quality or utility, and which would 
prevent inaccurate or ineffective modeling results from being 
rapidly, and perhaps imprudently, translated and disseminated to 
policymakers or the public. Specifically, there are no mechanisms 
for explicit post  hoc evaluation of model effectiveness, which 
would provide feedback to practitioners and close the science-
policy loop. Once a model is widely disseminated and utilized, its 
evidence may tend to become increasingly impervious to future 
challenges over legitimacy (10).
Justice
Scientists have an obligation to consider the equitable and non-
discriminatory distribution of benefits and burdens of research 
in light of the risks that may be undertaken by individuals in 
the population (3). Researchers cannot be held accountable for 
existing inequalities in populations at risk, but they must not 
worsen or create new inequalities or unfair consequences (3). 
Thus, in assessments of risk, scientists need to facilitate consid-
eration of not only the likelihood of a hazard occurring but also 
the consequences of its occurrence and/or the opportunity costs 
of managing it through control strategies applying to various 
subpopulations.
The use of forecasting models as decision support tools 
enables premeditated rather than reactive decisions about how, 
when, and to whom interventions will be applied to minimize 
harm. Modelers identify in advance how interventions are “best” 
allocated and thus determine who is likely to experience resultant 
benefits or harms if these are implemented in real-life scenarios. 
The consequences of unfair distribution of benefits and harms 
are non-trivial to incorporate into quantitative approximations 
of risk and thus are often excluded from interpretations of model 
analyses. For example, avian influenza models propose wide-
spread culling of susceptible poultry and mass administration 
of antiviral drugs in combination with regional quarantine to 
maximize overall public benefit for the international community 
by containing disease at its source (30). Although this utilitarian 
approach is scientifically sensible, it will invariably result in new 
inequalities regarding access to antiviral medication, exposure to 
risk, and imposition of restrictions on the rights and freedoms 
of certain individuals within disease-affected communities. 
Furthermore, these burdens are likely to be disproportionately 
5Boden and McKendrick Epidemiological Models As Evidence for Policymaking
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org April 2017 | Volume 5 | Article 68
borne by vulnerable individuals in low-income countries 
where disease is endemic and other risk factors for disease may 
predominate.
Inequalities in benefits or harms experienced within popula-
tions occur due to population variability. Variability is either 
attributable to individual heterogeneity or differences in the 
population due to other exogenous factors (e.g., wealth, educa-
tion, nutrition, sanitation, available healthcare, geographical 
location). Depending on the viewpoint of the decision-maker, 
the complex nature of the population “at risk” might be thought 
of as either variability or uncertainty. A hypothetical example 
is the use of a mathematical model to evaluate the efficacy of 
an intervention with different impacts on individuals with 
different genetic properties. Individuals might choose to see a 
lack of knowledge about their specific situation as uncertainty, 
which could in principle be resolved in the model to give a more 
“personal” range of outcomes. Given knowledge of one’s own 
genetics, it could be possible to use the model to judge whether 
the intervention is personally advantageous or not. A policy-
maker might choose to see heterogeneity as variability, which 
can be averaged across the population, when deciding whether 
the intervention should be approved for use across the health 
services. A reliance on only such averages may be unethical. 
If the output from a model does not facilitate consideration of 
the effect of interventions on individuals, or at least identifiable 
subpopulations, then, since potential ethical risks are foresee-
able, but unresolved, the model framework is unlikely to meet 
the “justice” test. Where variability can be attributed to known 
factors, provided that relevant parameters are known, it should 
be accounted for in the model design to reduce overall inequality 
and avoid unethical and unfair outcomes where possible (31). 
Differing perspectives on the availability and reliability of data 
might lead to different assessments of the extent to which a 
model meets the “justice” criterion. The design of models, the 
treatment of data, and the approach to interpreting results have 
considerable bearing on whether policy decisions are effective 
and ethical in practice.
trANsLAtiON FrOM scieNce tO 
POLicY: AccOUNtABiLitY
Modeling risks (and risk reduction) and managing risks are 
arguably two separate, independent activities. The former is the 
responsibility domain of the scientist; the latter belongs to the 
policymaker. However, the communication of advice on risk 
connects science to policy and blurs this distinction.
Ultimately, scientists have a responsibility to ensure that 
policymakers understand the strengths and weaknesses of the 
scientific evidence base. This includes an understanding of the 
socioeconomic and ethical impacts of biased or uncertain pre-
dictions that may lead to inappropriate policy implementation. 
Inaccurate model forecasts have rarely been punished: scientists 
in universities and non-governmental organizations do not have 
a “duty of care” and are not personally exposed to liability (26, 32). 
However, there is a growing public demand for accountability 
in delivery of effective and accurate risk communication from 
scientists and policymakers; this trend may have legal conse-
quences in the future [(33), (34), p. 16, (35)].
Mathematical models, as stand-alone predictive risk assess-
ment tools, have infrequently met all of the criteria for an ethi-
cal scientific evidence base for policy development. However, 
this does not preclude models from being useful tools for risk 
assessment, provided they are integrated with other types of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence. Mathematical models 
may be most ethical and best utilized in an exploratory context, 
as one of several complementary sources of scientific evidence 
that underpin strategic decisions about disease contingency 
planning.
To operationalize mathematical models so that they provide 
useful evidence for policy purposes, the following initiatives 
might be considered:
 1. Creation of partnerships between scientists, funding bodies, 
policymakers, and public stakeholders to mutually define the 
range of questions legitimately answerable via modeling, 
transparently communicate model outputs, and support 
interpretation of results and post hoc evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of model recommendations as implemented. Models 
should be developed and assessed using interdisciplinary, 
reflexive approaches that incorporate stakeholder knowledge 
and include agreed values and interests to promote trust and 
compliance with resulting model strategies.
 2. Development and progressive international harmonization of 
minimum standards of acceptable practice in model develop-
ment, parameterization, evaluation, and reporting. Coding 
standards and guidelines of best practice should be widely 
adopted, and the remit of the peer-review process, as it applies 
to the academic mathematical modeling literature, extended 
to incorporate concepts relating to transparency, beneficence, 
independence, and justice. Current peer-review practices are 
likely to be effective in handling issues relating to transpar-
ency and beneficence. Issues of independence and justice 
may require a greater cultural shift in peer-review practices 
if their explicit inclusion in the review exercise is to prove 
worthwhile.
 3. Universal registration of mathematical models utilized as evi-
dence in policymaking. A repository of published and unpub-
lished mathematical models [analogous to the Cochrane 
Library (36)] would help support an efficient, collaborative 
international approach to contingency planning for animal 
and human disease risks. This approach, which would create 
a transparent, searchable archive of evidence, could be a first 
step toward greater accessibility of model code (either directly 
via provision of open-source model code or indirectly via 
provision of pseudocode).
 4. Auditable processes for data stewardship should be a compo-
nent of every modeling study to protect stakeholders’ rights 
to privacy and confidentiality according to current legislation 
and ethical guidelines. Data stewardship includes responsibil-
ity for the administration, quality assessment, management, 
and security of all data and metadata.
 5. Bespoke ethical advisory bodies should be created to advise 
modelers of potential ethical risks and oversee the translation 
6Boden and McKendrick Epidemiological Models As Evidence for Policymaking
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org April 2017 | Volume 5 | Article 68
of modeling advice into policy. These bodies could subse-
quently act as knowledge brokers across the science–policy 
interface to facilitate ethical risk communication.
cONcLUsiON
Models have a useful and important role in informing policy, 
provided they are created robustly and ethically. This study is 
part of a larger programme of work assessing model resiliency 
and utility for outbreak preparedness, in which we are exploring 
whether inclusion of an ethical impact statement based on this 
framework, will deliver benefits to policymakers who are relying 
on model evidence in their decision-making processes. Modelers 
cannot absolve themselves of ethical responsibilities arising in 
model interpretation and implementation but have the option 
to create interdisciplinary collaborations with policymakers, 
stakeholders, and other experts to ensure these obligations are 
fulfilled. Ethical models will ultimately inspire and inform ethical 
policy choices.
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